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Abstract 
Questions of objectivity are perennial concerns of rhetorical critics—
whether it is attainable, what form it takes, and how generally its results may be 
held.  Given the celebrated “particularity” of any given rhetorical act, “objectivi-
ty” in rhetorical criticism is generally inadmissible as a standard for evaluation. 
The most frequent response to such questions is to assume a relativistic critical 
stance. Another alternative is to take a phenomenological approach—to let “the 
things” speak for “themselves.” This approach has taken root in communication 
studies, but less so in rhetorical criticism, given the (false) dilemma that the ob-
jectivity-subjectivity dichotomy forces. Edmund Husserl, in his last works, sug-
gests the real decision lies between “ideal” and genuine objectivity. This study, 
then, offers up this choice, and proposes—by examining Husserl’s later con-
cepts, method, and extensions—that rhetorical critics can, and perhaps should, 
seek genuine objectivity. 
Key words: Husserl, phenomenology, rhetorical criticism, science, history, lan-
guage 
 
Introduction 
 “No ideas but in things.” 
~William Carlos Williams 
 
“Zurück zu den Sachen selbst!” [Return to the things themselves!]  
~Edmund Husserl 
 
In the past 15 years or so, a number of communications scholars—a small 
handful of rhetorical critics among them—have taken a phenomenological ap-
proach to observed “phenomena,” armed with the vague call to action to account 
for “the things themselves” without the aid of theory, scientific or otherwise. 
Understood, per the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1970a), as an 
“inquiry back into the ground of” any given phenomenon, “to look open the 
obvious as questionable,” or, for Derrida, “to cut a path to what is already sup-
posed,” phenomenology has benefitted both broad, contemporary areas of in-
quiry as well as the disclosure of individual phenomena (p. 175, 180; Derrida, 
1978, p. 121). Phenomena most apparent in “the world” of women’s studies 
(Campbell, 2004; Fish, 1976; Hua, 2009; Isa, 2000; Sundén, 2001; Suter, 2004; 
Thompson, et al., 1990), queer studies (Ashford, 2006; Horncastle, 2009; Lind-
holm, 1998; Weeks, 1998; Weiss, 2005; Young, 2004), and race studies (Hal-
one, 2008; Haritaworn, 2009; Jackson, 1998; Martinez, 2006; McPhail, 1996), to 
cite only the broadest fields, have all been the object of phenomenological cri-
tiques. 
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Even within the field of rhetoric, a small, sometimes exclusive variety of 
phenomenological approaches have been rendered as a meta-critic. Lanigan, 
from this perspective suggests (for example) that in traditional situational criti-
cism, “one gains a conception (a sedimentation) of a situation, but not a percep-
tion of the value constituents that constitute the primordial act of speaking with 
intent” (1969, p. 64). That is, we may have rhetorical history but not rhetorical 
criticism, a distinction of value for the rhetorical critic. Other prominent rhetori-
cal scholars, too—namely Gregg, Aune, Rosenfield, and Blair recommend phe-
nomenological approaches to rhetorical criticism, that, we shall see, ultimately 
fall short of Husserl’s original intention. 
Gregg (1966) takes the view of the psychologist that “behavior is not so 
much a function of an external event as it is a product of the individual’s percep-
tion of the event” (p. 83). In recommending a phenomenological psychology for 
rhetorical criticism, Gregg looks to a rhetor’s cognitive structure as an intellec-
tual and symbolic ordering and as the basis for his or her actions. It is not clear if 
Husserl ever came to terms with psychology, but it is clear that Gregg’s ap-
proach brackets out the world of others. Lanigan takes the view of the existen-
tialist who sees self in terms of the world, whereas it is clear Husserl reversed 
these. For Lanigan, a rhetor “constitutes a phenomenon wherein meaning is 
"bracketed" within a Gestalt.” This, a rhetorical act, calls a rhetorical situation 
into being, effectively reversing Bitzer’s original conception (1969, p. 61). Aune 
(1981) takes the view of the hermeneuticist, settling for “a description of the 
sedimentations involved in an initial encounter with the statement, a ‘making 
strange’ of the statement through free variation in the imagination, and, finally a 
search for invariant structures that appear through the process of free variation” 
(p. 102). There is textual evidence in Husserl to suggest that this is not inappro-
priate: “The horizon-exposition to which we recurred must not bog down in 
vague, superficial talk; it must itself arrive at its own sort of scientific discipline. 
The sentences in which it is expressed must be fixed and capable of being made 
self-evident again and again” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 374). That is to say, add rea-
son and Aune’s approach becomes Husserlian. Rosenfield (1974) takes the view 
of the aestheticist, preferring to “release himself, letting the phenomena ‘speak 
to him’ through their luminosity” (p. 494-495). Rhetorical criticism here would 
take shape as an appreciation of “expression[s] of the human spirit,” and thus 
probably be more accurately called literary criticism.  
Blair (1981), finally, does not so much suggest a new method for criticism 
as to provide us with a simple way to conceive—in Husserl’s terms—the range 
of rhetorical criticism. Starting from an early Husserlian conception of three 
ways of intending—being conscious of—an object (presentation, judgment, feel-
ing), Blair shows us how the psychologist, existentialist, hermeneuticist, and 
aestheticist essentially overemphasize one of these intentionalities. That being 
said, Gregg’s critical method looks to “that which is the object of feeling and 
judgment. . . . the content of the phenomenon,” and so emphasizes a rhetor’s 
presentational intentionality, while Rosenfield “appreciates” the aesthetic 
givenness, or feeling, of a phenomenon—its affective intentionality (Blair, 1981, 
p. 56). What Blair argues is that these phenomenological approaches to rhetori-
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cal criticism are incomplete: they all overlook a “final mode of intentionality” 
namely, evaluation. The Husserlian approach to which Blair refers and this 
study recommends incorporates at once all four of these intentionalities. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with these recent critical treatments, but 
each one brings with it not only its own method, but also its own set of presup-
positions. The first fault is benign—after all, phenomenology is a methodology, 
not a method. The second fault is probably also benign, presuming that one had 
indeed returned to the “things themselves.” But Husserl, late in life, was able to 
observe how his early phenomenology was being utilized and metamorphosed 
by his former students Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Arendt, among 
others, and sought to refine his original idea. Against existential phenomenolo-
gy, for example, which seeks to disclose the things themselves in terms of total 
subjectivity, Husserl (1970a) asks, “Is its irrationality not finally rather a nar-
row-minded and bad rationality, worse than that of the old rationalism?” (p. 16) 
Does not even the subjective approach presume at least one ideally objective 
fact—namely, universal subjectivity, or relativity? Beyond this, Derrida (1978) 
points out:  
 
there is another naiveté just as serious, but with a more modern style: naive-
té of profundity or depth and not of superficiality, it consists in redescend-
ing toward the prescientific perception without making problematic . . . con-
tinually keep[ing] alive the question: how can the a priori of scientific Ob-
jectivity be constituted starting from those of the life-world? Without this 
question, any return, however penetrating, risks abdicating all scientific 
quality in general and all philosophical dignity . . . we see to what irrespon-
sible empiricism all the ‘phenomenologies’ of prescientific perception are 
condemned, phenomenologies which would not let themselves be beset by 
that question. (p. 120) 
 
Phenomenology for Husserl was from the start intended to be a “rigorous 
science,” and thus he sought in his fourth “Introduction to Phenomenology”—
after Ideas (1913), Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), and Cartesian 
Meditations (1931)—his final, unfinished work The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology (1937)—to give his own  definitive state-
ment. As The Crisis took shape, Husserl “repeatedly designated this series of 
essays as the crowning achievement of his life’s work,” according to another 
student of his, Schutz (Husserl, 1970a, p. xxix). 
Prolific as he was, Husserl is nonetheless notoriously difficult to read in 
translation. If this study accomplishes nothing else, it aims to make accessible to 
rhetoricians (and communications scholars broadly) a précis of Husserl’s “defin-
itive” late phenomenology—its fundamental concepts, moves, and implications. 
Along the way, its relevance to the rhetorical critic will be made clear. Because 
he is wont to teach his phenomenology as he constructs it, this study can only do 
the same. The reader is asked for a bit of “teleological” indulgence. 
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Husserl’s Late Phenomenology 
When Husserl set out late in life in search of “The Origin of Geometry,” he 
came to a striking conclusion, one most rhetoricians today take for granted. To 
the primary question “[H]ow does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sci-
ences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure with-
in the conscious space of the first inventor’s soul, to its ideal objectivity?,” Hus-
serl answered that “In advance we see that it occurs by means of language, 
through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic living body [Sprachleib]” 
(1970b, p. 357-358). In coming to this conclusion, Husserl hit upon not only the 
rhetorical basis of the sciences, but the rhetorical fundament of all human insti-
tutions. His simple answer is misleading, though, presupposing in one premise 
what will take him all of The Crisis (and supplementary texts) to make self-
evident: The geometer (nor, presumably, the reader) does not see this “in ad-
vance”—and herein lies the crisis.  
Focused as it is on its forward development, all of science has come to 
“speak” a shared, efficient, self-sufficient language. Logic, understood by scien-
tists as “the universal, a priori, fundamental science for all objective sciences,” 
is, for Husserl (1970b), “nothing but naiveté” in that “out of sentences with sed-
imented signification, logical ‘dealing’ can produce only other // sentences of 
the same character” (p. 365-366). Logical constructions have, from the start, 
lacked a full grounding in original self-evidence, and without this, any one logi-
cal construction “hangs in mid-air, without support” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 141). 
Self-evidence, for Husserl, “means nothing more than grasping an entity with 
the consciousness of its original being-itself-there [Selbst-da]. Successful reali-
zation of a project is, for the acting subject, self-evidence; in this self-evidence, 
what has been realized is there, originaliter, as itself” (1970b, p. 356). Logic, in 
leaving behind this original self-evidence, by implication leaves behind a part, 
however small, of the world—namely, the past “present” and the people living 
in it. Restricted by an internal language and negligent of large swaths of the 
world, science as it is practiced cannot attain its goal (telos) of genuine objec-
tivity, understood by Husserl (1970c) as “that which is—for all conceivable 
civilizations (including Papuans), [for all] experiences, [all] surrounding worlds, 
which are assumed to be experiencing the same things” (p. 321). To the extent 
that this is so, “objectivity,” as scientists and most of us understand it, is an ideal 
objectivity—its “facts” are no more valid than any other particular “cultural 
facts.” 
“The Crisis of European Sciences” is the same today as it was in Husserl’s 
1930s: the products of scientific inquiry, despite their “ideal” status in the world, 
fall short of their “objective” claim to the total world. Science can not answer 
some of the most important, human questions. Can rhetoricians better answer 
these questions, as Husserl seems to indicate? Can the rhetorical critic make 
objective claims which hold for the total world? Can the claims of a rhetor be 
critiqued or judged against any objective standard? What follows describes two 
misguided “ideals” and how through Husserl’s late phenomenology, “the things 
themselves” can be understood genuinely objectively. 
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Scientific “Objectivity” and the A Priori of the Life-World 
If anything in the world is to be held, per Husserl’s definition, as genuinely 
“objective”—and not merely ideally so, as in the sciences, one will have to 
transcend the naiveté of the scientific (logical-theoretical) purview and return, as 
it were, to the original naiveté of the life-world—the world in which we normal-
ly, straightforwardly live—to find it. To return to an original, prescientific na-
iveté is not a simple matter—it requires, in fact, a complete change of attitude. 
This change takes place through what Husserl (1970a) calls an epoche: “a with-
holding of natural, naïve validities and in general of validities already in effect” 
(p. 135). With respect to science, this means that the phenomenologist avoids 
“all participation” in the scientist’s paradigms, interests, aims, and activities. 
Rather, through the epoche, the phenomenologist adopts the “natural” attitude of 
normal living in the pregiven world—for all of us, including scientists, “the 
world.”  
In this “natural,” pregiven world, we all “move in a current of ever new ex-
periences, judgments, valuations, decisions” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 144). Here is 
found all of our goals and ends, of which the scientific goal of “objectivity” is 
but a part. It is true that all human interests—“all theoretical and practical goals 
taken as themes—as existing, as perhaps existing, as probable, as questionable, 
as valuable, as project, as action and result of action”—are directed towards ob-
jects in the world, and obviously this is the case in science (1970a, p. 149). Nev-
ertheless, in the natural attitude, we are normally satisfied to base and judge our 
decisions and actions in “validity,” rather than (scientific) objectivity. “Every-
thing becomes perfectly clear” in the epoche of the objective sciences, says Hus-
serl (1970c), “when we say to ourselves, or each of us says to himself: the world 
of which I speak, the world of which the Chinese speaks, of which the Greek of 
Solon’s time, the Papuan speaks, is always a world having subjective validity, 
even the world of the scientist, who as such is a Greek-European man” (p. 325; 
my italics).  
 
“Factual” History and the A Priori of History 
With the last clause, Husserl introduces to his phenomenology the problem 
of history. The scientist, “a Greek-European man,” is himself a product and pro-
ducer of history (and, as such, a man). The validities which the scientist produc-
es in his forward advance necessarily presuppose the work and validities prof-
fered by scientists before him on which the latter scientist will build. The latest 
scientific advance implicitly brings with it all the science of the past, which in 
its time was the latest scientific advance. In fact, everything that “exists in its 
essential being as tradition and handing-down” presupposes this a priori of his-
tory (Husserl, 1970b, p. 372). For Husserl, this includes “any given cultural 
fact” (e.g., science, geometry) and in toto, the “whole cultural world, in all its 
forms” (p. 354). All cultural facts, or phenomena, are ideal objects—are consti-
tuted historically from earlier, sedimented cultural facts, and these, in turn be-
come the “working materials” for cultural facts to come (p. 369). This phenom-
enon allows Husserl to redefine history as “from the start nothing other than the 
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vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original formations 
and sedimentations of meaning” (p. 371). 
For the rhetorical critic who regularly deals in cultural facts, formations, 
and meanings, this means that to understand any one phenomenon—in full self-
evidence—is “to be conscious of its historicity’’ (Husserl, 1970b, p.370). A 
phenomenon’s historicity is not the same as its “history,” in the traditional sense. 
“History” as a field of study presumes to issue in “objectivity” as much as sci-
ence, and when it behaves as a science, stakes its claims too on formerly valid, 
now taken-for-granted, “facts.”  Historicism particularly and “factual histories” 
generally fail to achieve their goal of (genuine) “objectivity,” insofar as their 
proponents presuppose many “facts” that in the past could not have been be held 
genuinely objectively. The parts of “the world” which lied outside the past histo-
rian’s purview remain outside—even implicitly—the present historian’s gaze, 
no matter how much the contemporary historian may verify against state-of-the-
art standards of “historical objectivity.” 
Historicity, on the other hand, encompasses—or, better—constitutes all 
“histories.” If we take seriously Husserl’s definition of history (above), historici-
ty becomes that which constitutes “the whole sphere of absolute ideal Objectivi-
ty and all the eidetic sciences” (Derrida, 1978, p. 121). Just as all “sciences” 
practiced today have this historicity, our latest “histories” share this essence, too. 
Like “geometry”, any one of today’s “historical sciences” (“schools”) achieves 
no more than an ideal objectivity. Like “geometry,” “history” today is itself a 
cultural fact as it produces cultural facts; like geometry, it and its products can 
be studied as a phenomenon by rhetorical critics. What this means, however, is 
that if the rhetorician aspires to genuine objectivity, he or she can not turn to any 
of the methods and concepts of “science” or of “history” as it is practiced. Hus-
serl suggests the critic must somehow “strike through the crust of the external-
ized ‘historical facts’ of philosophical history, interrogating, exhibiting, and 
testing their inner meaning and hidden teleology” (1970a, p. 18). What is re-
quired once more is an epoche, this time of “factual history” (or “history”).  
Back in the natural world—the “prehistoric” world if you will—we realize 
everything—all people, acts, and ends—are thoroughly historical, but not neces-
sarily “as if the temporal becoming in which we ourselves have evolved were 
merely an external causal series” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 71). To be genuinely objec-
tive, history must be able to give an account of “the essentially general structure 
lying in our present and then in every past or future historical present as such” 
(Husserl, 1970b, p. 372). Because “only in the final establishment is this re-
vealed,” Husserl recommends a “teleological” approach to history (1970a, p. 
73). (This is the overall method of The Crisis (Parts I and II), and “The Origin of 
Geometry,” as will be illustrated in the next part of this study). History made in 
this manner starts with what is, as a phenomenon to be made self-evident. Self-
evidence can come only from “a critical over-all view which brings to light, 
behind ‘historical facts’ of documented philosophical theories and their apparent 
oppositions and parallels, a meaningful, final harmony” (1970a, p. 73). The ben-
efit that accrues to rhetorical critics who take this view is that any critical claim 
established in this way (i.e., that accounts for present as much as the past) “can 
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never be decisively refuted by citing the documented ‘personal testimony’ [sub-
jective validity] of earlier philosophers” (1970a, p. 73). This view is, once more, 
the natural attitude. 
 
Genuine Objectivity 
In the natural attitude, then, (after the epoche of the objective sciences and 
the epoche of factual history), “the world” is not only a world having subjective 
validity, for me and then for us, but also a world having historicity, wherein eve-
rything (all people, acts, and ends) are thoroughly historical. These characteriza-
tions Husserl calls, respectively, the “a priori of the life-world” and the “a priori 
of history.”  For the rhetorical critic, or any investigator, these may be taken as 
two “healthy” presuppositions on which genuinely objective critical statements 
may be based. Admittedly, these a priori are already “taken for granted” by most 
rhetoricians, and taken alone, do not immediately suggest how to proceed mak-
ing such statements. To what, if not “science” or “history,” does the critic turn?  
These a priori do, however, suggest the radical generality required for a tru-
ly objective critical stance—one that is valid for the total world, present, past, 
and future. For many rhetorical critics, this forces a decision of priority, between 
the (celebrated) particularity of rhetorical acts and critical objectivity. Only each 
critic may decide which to emphasize. Husserl, for his part, endorses the latter, 
and for those who choose to follow this sort of phenomenological approach, he 
shows the way he has taken to reach this goal. In the next part of this study, I 
will illuminate his path with a map and a synoptic illustration. In the part follow-
ing, I will draw from this critical example—an act of rhetorical criticism in its 
own right—implications and future directions for the phenomenological rhetori-
cal critic. 
 
Husserl’s Late Method 
Recall that the phenomenon Husserl critiques in The Crisis is “ideal objec-
tivity” in science. Two central questions essentially frame his inquiry: (1) How 
has original, genuine objectivity become, in science, “idealized?”, and (2) Can 
we re-attain the original sense of genuine objectivity?  
The second question is, in fact, the fundamental question asked in all phe-
nomenological inquiry: How can any object, or phenomenon, be made present 
and self-evident? Already in The Crisis, Husserl has, through the epoche of fac-
tual history and the epoche of objective science, respectively, disclosed two a 
priori that comprised the “original” present sense of objectivity and that, moving 
forward, should form the basis of genuine objectivity. Is this not also the funda-
mental question asked by the rhetor as he or she conceives a rhetoric: How can 
this idea of mine be made present and self-evident to my hearers (watchers, 
readers, etc.)? The first question shapes the majority of The Crisis, but its perti-
nence too should not be lost on rhetorical critics. Many of our critical questions 
take this same form: How has any particular cultural object become ideal—
shared or sharable, communicated or communicable? What “in any given [cul-
tural] situation [are] the available means of persuasion?”  
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In “The Origin of Geometry,” synopsized below, Husserl answers both 
questions in one act. In so doing, he performs, unbeknownst to him, an act of 
rhetorical criticism. For the benefit of the rhetorical critic, what follows is, in 
Husserl’s own estimation, “exemplary” of his last, definitive phenomenological 
method. In the passage that leads, from The Crisis, Husserl (1970a) describes his 
own method for achieving genuine objectivity—for making present and self-
evident—about philosophy. Given now the a priori of the life-world and the a 
priori of history, it is both easy and appropriate for the rhetorical critic to substi-
tute for “philosophy” the name of any phenomenon:  
           
What is clearly necessary . . . is that we reflect back, in a thorough histori-
cal and critical fashion in order to provide, before all decisions, for a radi-
cal self-understanding: we must inquire back into what was originally and 
always sought in philosophy, what was continually sought by all the philos-
ophers and philosophies that have communicated with one another histori-
cally; but this must include a critical [judgmental] consideration of what, in 
respect to the goals and methods [of philosophy], is ultimate, original, and 
genuine and which, once seen, apodictically conquers the will. (p. 17-18; 
his italics) 
 
Synopsis of “The Origin of Geometry” (Husserl, 1970b) 
1.  “Science,” like “[e]very spiritual accomplishment,” necessarily must have a 
beginning: “first as a project and then in successful execution” (p. 356); 
 
2. The goal of science, “objectivity,” was established by “mathematizing” the 
objects found  in nature;  
 
3. As such, it bases all of its validities (“facts”) on this “geometrization”; 
 
4. To understand the “original motivation and movement of thought which led 
to the conceiving” of this idealization of nature, we must “inquire back into 
the original meaning of the handed-down geometry, which continued to be 
valid with this very same meaning—continued and at the same time was 
developed further, remaining simply “geometry” in all its new forms” (p. 
353); 
 
5. Galileo is the “consummating discoverer” of this idea; with him, it “appears 
for the first time, so to speak, as full-blown” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 52, 57); 
 
6. Whatever in his surrounding world—formally or materially—motivated 
him to conceive “geometry” serves also as the phenomenological basis for 
all later “objectivity.” Whatever this is must have been self-evident to him. 
(Most likely, much was implicitly taken-for-granted by him. It falls to the 
phenomenologist to “unearth” what is tacitly presupposed.);  
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7. The “most obvious [material] commonplaces” Galileo “had at his disposal. . 
. that which must have served as the material for his generalizations” would 
have included at least space-time, shapes, figures, corporeality, motion, de-
formation, measuring, preferred shapes, smoothing, perfection. (These too 
are “objects,” and may, in fact, prescribe a whole other phenomenological 
investigation.) (1970b, p. 376); 
 
8. These objects, in order to be generalizable, to exhibit “objectivity,” must 
have been made “ideal objects,” capable of outliving its discoverer as part 
of “the inner historicity of the individuals” (p. 372). That is, a continuity 
from one person to another, from one time to another, must have been capa-
ble of being carried out. It is clear that the method of producing original 
idealities out of what is prescientifically given in the cultural world must 
have been written down and fixed in firm sentences prior to the existence of 
geometry; furthermore, the capacity for translating these sentences from 
vague [passive] linguistic understanding into the clarity of the reactivation 
of their self-evident  meaning must have been, in its own way, handed down 
and ever capable of being handed down. (1970b, p. 365)  
 
9. Documentation—the capacity to inscribe—of these ideal objects makes 
their communication possible from person-to-person, and across time (pp. 
360-361). In the documenting, what would have been originally self-evident 
to Galileo is substituted by words, symbols, and figures—an efficient “lan-
guage” for the total geometrical structure: How the living tradition of the 
meaning-formation of elementary concepts is actually carried on can be 
seen in elementary geometrical instruction and its textbooks; what we actu-
ally learn there is how to deal with ready-made concepts and sentences in a 
rigorously methodical way. Rendering the concepts sensibly intuitable by 
means of drawn figures is substituted for the production of the primal ide-
alities. (p. 365);  
 
10. This efficiency, and the “extraordinarily far-reaching practical usefulness 
became of itself a major motive for the advancement and appreciation of 
these sciences” (p. 369). As more and more ideal objects began to encom-
pass and extend “the world,”  the original self-evidence, sedimented by lan-
guage, and then later merely presumed, “made itself felt so little” that it was 
completely lost—not present—if only temporarily;  
 
11. In not accounting for the original self-evidence, at least part of the historical 
world and the persons living in it, persons have been unaccounted for. Thus 
original, genuine “objectivity”—valid for all conceivable people, present, 
past and future—became for all sciences, merely “ideal objectivity” or “ide-
ality” (pp. 365-366).  
 
From this brief account, we can now understand historically how one phe-
nomenon, geometry and by implication, all of science, has historically achieved 
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it “ideal objectivity,” or what we commonly reference as “objectivity.” Critical-
ly, we know now why this “ideal objectivity” falls short of science’s original 
goal—genuine objectivity. For rhetorical critics interested in the phenomenolog-
ical approach, “The Origin of Geometry” offers at least an exemplar of Hus-
serl’s method—of the epoche, for example. Better, it demonstrates this having 
already incorporated the a priori of the life-world and the a priori of history—
that is, from within the natural attitude.  
 
Extensions of Husserl’s Late Phenomenology 
Beyond its exemplary function, Husserl’s approach to “The Origin of Ge-
ometry” can be extended in any number of directions. Any one of the steps 
enumerated above, for example, can serve as launching points for an entirely 
new phenomenological inquiry, to be conducted in the same, iterable fashion. In 
this sense, phenomenological inquiry is open—never really “finished.” “[A]n 
infinity of ever new phenomena” may be disclosed— 
 
an infinity because continued penetration shows that every phenomenon at-
tained through this unfolding of meaning, given at first in the life-world as 
obviously existing, itself contains meaning- and validity-implications whose 
exposition leads again to new phenomena, and so on. . . . just as any newly 
developed form [of meaning] is destined to become material, namely, to 
function in the constitution of [some new] form. (Husserl, 1970a, p. 112) 
 
In addition, because “a whole class of spiritual products of the cultural 
world” enjoy the same “ideal objectivity” (as evidenced above in the range of 
phenomenon discussed in the literature review above), any one of this class of 
cultural phenomena can be examined in this manner. Because language is the 
fundament of this “ideal objectivity”—is how any such phenomenon is ideal-
ized, validated across subjects, communalized, this phenomenology can be com-
fortable conducted from within a rhetorical perspective. Finally, because “lan-
guage itself, in all its particularizations (words, sentences, speeches), is, as can 
easily be seen from the grammatical point of view, thoroughly made up of ideal 
objects,” we not only begin to understand Kenneth Burke’s motive in the 
Grammar, but we are also and ultimately enjoined to disclose the phenomenon 
“rhetoric” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 357).  
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